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THE TRUSTEE'S DUTY TO INFORM*
T.P. GALLANIS**
This Article examines an aspect of trust fiduciary law historically
ignored in the law reviews: the trustee's duty to provide information
to the trust's beneficiaries about the trust and its administration.
The time is ripe for analysis because the scope of the duty to inform
provoked contentious debate during the drafting of the recently
promulgated Uniform Trust Code ("UTC"), and all twenty of the
enacting jurisdictions, including North Carolina, have substantially
modified the UTC's provisions. Part I lays the descriptive
foundation, explaining the requirements of the duty to inform under
the UTC, under North Carolina's version of the UTC, and in the
other nineteen enacting jurisdictions. Part H contains the normative
analysis, addressing the central questions about the duty to inform:
should trust law contain a duty to inform and, if so, should the duty
be mandatory or should it be a mere default? To answer the first
question, the Article draws on two interdisciplinary perspectives:
legal history and law and economics. These perspectives reveal that
the duty to inform has a distinguished pedigree within the history of
Anglo-American law reaching back nearly two centuries and that
the duty performs a vital function today. Establishing the duty's
normative basis, the Article then considers whether the duty should
be mandatory at least in part, as in the UTC, or wholly default law,
as in North Carolina. To answer this question, the Article enters
into and extends the ongoing debate over whether trusts are
primarily contracts or property arrangements. Rejecting the strong
contractarian approach as inconsistent with the direction of the
modern law of fiduciary administration and drawing attention to
the beneficiaries' unique position and incentives to supervise and
enforce the trustee's fiduciary obligations, the Article concludes that
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the beneficiaries must have the information needed to exercise their
supervisory and enforcement powers, irrespective of the wishes of
the settlor. The duty to inform can be default law at the margins but
must maintain a mandatory core.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines an aspect of trust fiduciary law historically
ignored in the law reviews': the trustee's duty to provide information
to the trust's beneficiaries about the trust and its administration.
Academic writing has concentrated on the other fiduciary duties, such
as loyalty, prudence, and impartiality. The duty to inform is due for
scholarly treatment.
The time is ripe. The rules of trust law, including those
governing the duty to inform, have assumed a special interest since
1. The two principal law review articles on the duty to inform are recent. See
Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts, 38
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713 (2006) (analyzing privacy as a crucial distinction between wills and
revocable trusts and also as an obstacle to the drafting and enactment of Uniform Trust
Code ("UTC") provisions on the duty to inform); Kevin D. Millard, The Trustee's Duty to
Inform and Report under the Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 373
(2005) (examining the UTC's provisions and those of the first ten enacting jurisdictions).
The duty to inform is also discussed as one topic among others in articles examining the
UTC more broadly, such as David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000):
Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 Mo. L. REV. 143, 199-203 (2002); Edward C.
Halbach Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law at Century's
End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1914-15 (2000); and Alan Newman, The Intention of the
Settlor under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose Property Is It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV.
649, 675-81 (2005).
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the year 2000, when the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") 2 promulgated the Uniform Trust
Code ("UTC")3 for state legislatures to consider for enactment. As
legislatures evaluate whether the provisions of the UTC are
appropriate for their states, the opportunity arises to consider what
trust law is (the descriptive question) and should be (the normative
question).
The descriptive and normative questions are especially relevant
for the duty to inform. To date, twenty jurisdictions4 have enacted
portions of the UTC, but the UTC's provisions on the duty to inform
have never been adopted verbatim. Rather, the enacting states have
modified them in various ways, with the result that no two states'
provisions on the duty to inform are precisely the same. It is,
therefore, a particularly important time for persons subject to trust
law-including settlors, beneficiaries, and trustees-to understand
what is the governing law and for scholars and policymakers to
analyze what it should be.
Part I of this Article lays the descriptive foundation, explaining
the requirements of the duty to inform. Part I is divided into three.5
The duty to inform under the UTC is considered first. Next is the
duty to inform under the law of North Carolina, a fitting selection
because of this journal but also, and more significant, because the
North Carolina version of the UTC is among the most recent: it
became effective on January 1, 2006.6 This will be the first Article
addressing the duty under North Carolina law, a duty important both
to the state's growing population7 and to the trust departments in the
2. Information about NCCUSL is available on its Web site. Uniform Law
Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
3. UNIF. TRUST CODE (last amended in 2005), 7C U.L.A. 362 (2006), available at
http://www.utcproject.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
4. Alabama, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. See The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
http://www.utcproject.orglutc/DesktopDefault.aspx ?tabindex2&tabid=50 (last visited
Aug. 10, 2007).
5. Cf. JULIUS CAESAR, DE BELLO GALLICO, LIBER I, available at
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/caesar/galll.shtml (last visited Aug. 10, 2007) ("Gallia est
omnis divisa in partes tres .... ).
6. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36C-1-101 to -11-1106 (2005) (effective Jan. 1, 2006).
7. See Sam Roberts, Arizona Displaces Nevada as Fastest-Growing State, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2006, at A24 (observing that from July 1, 2005 to July 1, 2006, North
Carolina was the seventh fastest growing state and is now among the ten most populous).
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state's thriving banking industry.8 The third part is a brief overview,
necessarily general, of how the UTC's provisions on the duty to
inform have been modified in the other nineteen enacting
jurisdictions.
Part II of the Article contains the normative analysis. It
addresses the central questions about the duty to inform: should trust
law contain a duty to inform and, if so, should the duty be mandatory
or should it be a mere default, waivable by the settlor? To answer the
first question, the Article draws on two interdisciplinary perspectives:
legal history and law and economics. These perspectives reveal that
the duty to inform has a distinguished pedigree within the history of
Anglo-American law reaching back nearly two centuries and that the
duty performs a vital function today. Establishing the duty's
normative basis, the Article then considers whether the duty should
be mandatory at least in part, as in the UTC, or wholly default law, as
in North Carolina. To answer this question, the Article enters into
and extends the ongoing debate over whether trusts are primarily
contracts or property arrangements. Rejecting the strong
contractarian approach as inconsistent with the direction of the
modern law of fiduciary administration and drawing attention to the
beneficiaries' unique position and incentives to supervise and enforce
the trustee's fiduciary obligations, the Article concludes that the
beneficiaries must have the information needed to exercise their
supervisory and enforcement powers, irrespective of the wishes of the
settlor. The duty to inform can be default law at the margins but
must maintain a mandatory core.
I. THE DESCRIPTIVE FOUNDATION
Part I of the Article lays the descriptive foundation, examining
the requirements and contours of the duty to inform under the UTC,
the law of North Carolina, and the laws of the other nineteen
enacting jurisdictions.
A. The Duty to Inform Under the Uniform Trust Code
The UTC's provisions on the duty to inform provide answers to
four crucial questions.
The first question is: To which beneficiaries does the trustee owe
the duty? Under the UTC, the duty to inform is owed to some extent
8. See, e.g., Dan Fitzpatrick, Built on Finance: As Steel Shaped Pittsburgh, Banking
Defines Charlotte, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTrE, June 27, 2006, at A8 (reporting that
Charlotte is the second largest center for banking in the United States, behind New York).
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to all of the trust's beneficiaries,9 whether they hold present interests
or future interests, vested or contingent, in the trust, but the extent of
the duty varies with the proximity (or, conversely, remoteness) of the
beneficiary's interest.'0  For this purpose, the UTC divides
beneficiaries into three categories. Category 1 comprises
beneficiaries who are, on the relevant date, distributees or
permissible distributees of trust income or principal.11 To see this
definition in operation, consider the following example.
Example 1. G creates a trust providing for income to A for
life, then remainder in corpus to B.
During A's lifetime, A is a Category 1 beneficiary, but B is not.
A is a distributee, whereas distributions to B can be made only after
A's death.
Category 2 comprises all "qualified beneficiaries,' 12 a term that,
as defined in UTC section 103(13), is broader than Category 1 and
includes a beneficiary
who, on the date the beneficiary's qualification is determined:
(A) is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or
principal; (B) would be a distributee or permissible distributee
of trust income or principal if the interests of the distributees
described in subparagraph (A) terminated on that date without
causing the trust to terminate; or (C) would be a distributee or
permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the trust
terminated on that date. 3
In Example 1 during A's lifetime, both A and B are Category 2
beneficiaries, though A is also a Category 1 beneficiary. A is a
9. "[T]he trustee [must] promptly respond to the request of any beneficiary ... for
information related to the administration of the trust. Performance is excused only if
compliance is unreasonable under the circumstances." UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 cmt.
(2005) (emphasis added).
10. The UTC provides:
Due to the difficulty of identifying beneficiaries whose interests are remote and
contingent, and because such beneficiaries are not likely to have much interest in
the day-to-day affairs of the trust, the Uniform Trust Code uses the concept of
"qualified beneficiary" . .. to limit the class of beneficiaries to whom certain
notices must be given or consents received.
Id. § 103 cmt.
11. See id. § 813(c).
12. Id. § 103(13). For the use of this term in the context of the duty to inform, see id.
§ 813(a), (b)(2)-(4), (c).
13. Id. § 103(13).
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"distributee ... of trust income,"14 and B "would be a distributee ...
of trust ... principal if the trust terminated .... ,"5 The most likely
reason for termination would be the death of the income beneficiary,
A.
Consider a second example.
Example 2. G's will creates a trust providing for income to
G's surviving spouse, S, for life, then income to such of G's
children who survive S for their respective lives, and at the
death of G's last surviving child, remainder in corpus to G's
then-living descendants, by representation.
16
G has one child, A. A has two children (G's grandchildren), J
and K. J and K each have one child (G's great-grandchildren):
J's child, X, and K's child, Y.
At the relevant date, the living members of the family are S,
A,J,X, and Y.
In Example 2, S is a Category 1 beneficiary because S is currently
a distributee of trust income. The Category 2 or "qualified"
beneficiaries are S, A, J, and Y. S is a "distributee ... of trust
income";17 A "would be ... a distributee ... of trust income ... if the
interest[] of [S] ... terminated . ;18 and J and Y "would be ...
distributee[s] ... of trust ... principal if the trust terminated ....""
The most likely reason for trust termination would be the death of S
and A.
The UTC also has a Category 3, comprising beneficiaries not in
Categories 1 or 2. In Example 2, X would be in Category 3.
Again it is important to state that each category of
beneficiaries-i, 2, or 3-is entitled at least to some information.
The second question is: To what information is a beneficiary
entitled? Under the UTC, Category 3 beneficiaries are entitled to
five types of information, though only upon request; the information
need not be furnished automatically. The trustee must (1) furnish
"upon request ... a copy of the trust instrument,' '20 meaning (as the
14. Id. § 103(13)(A).
15. Id. § 103(13)(C).
16. This example is valid under the Rule Against Perpetuities. Each of G's children
validates his or her own contingent remainder for life, and the last survivor of G's children
validates the contingent remainder in G's then-living descendants. For the classic
summary of the Rule, see W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV.
638 (1938).
17. UNIF.TRUST CODE § 103(13)(A).
18. Id. § 103(13)(B).
19. Id. § 103(13)(C).
20. Id. § 813(b)(1).
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UTC comment explains) "a complete copy of the trust instrument
and not merely ... those portions the trustee deems relevant to the
beneficiary's interest;"'21 (2) furnish upon request "at least annually
and at the termination of the trust ... a report of the trust property,
liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including the source and
amount of the trustee's compensation, a listing of the trust assets, and,
if feasible, their respective market values 2 2 (referred to in this Article
as a "UTC Trust Report"); (3) upon request,23 provide notice "within
60 days after accepting a trusteeship ... of the acceptance and of the
trustee's name, address, and telephone number; 24 (4) upon request, 25
provide notice
within 60 days after the date the trustee acquires knowledge of
the creation of an irrevocable trust, or the date the trustee
acquires knowledge that a formerly revocable trust has become
irrevocable ..., of the trust's existence, of the identity of the
settlor or settlors, of the right to request a copy of the trust
instrument, and of the right to a ... [UTC Trust Report];26
and (5) upon request,27 provide notice "in advance of any change in
the method or rate of the trustee's compensation. '28 In addition to
these five categories of information, the UTC provides that the
trustee should "promptly respond" to the request of a Category 3
beneficiary for other information "related to the administration of the
trust" unless the request is "unreasonable under the circumstances.''29
Category 2 beneficiaries (in the UTC's parlance, "qualified
beneficiaries" ' 30) are entitled to the rights of Category 3 beneficiaries
and considerably more. The trustee "shall" keep them "reasonably
informed about the administration of the trust and of the material
facts necessary for them to protect their interests."' 31 In addition to
performing this general duty, the trustee must (1) provide the notices
discussed above for Category 3 beneficiaries whether or not the
21. Id. § 813 cmt. For discussion of the beneficiary's access to the entire instrument or
merely to portions affecting his interest, see Foster, supra note 1, at 716 n.18.
22. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(c).
23. See id. § 110(a).
24. Id. § 813(b)(2).
25. See id. § 110(a).
26. Id. § 813(b)(3).
27. See id. § 10(a).
28. Id. § 813(b)(4).
29. Id. § 813(a).
30. Id. § 103(13). For additional uses of the term, see id. § 813(a), (b)(2)-(3), (c).
31. Id. § 813(a).
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Category 2 beneficiary has made a request for notice;3 2 (2) send to
Category 2 beneficiaries, "at least annually and at the termination of
the trust," the UTC Trust Report if the beneficiary has requested it;33
and (3) send to Category 2 beneficiaries a UTC Trust Report if there
is a "vacancy in the trusteeship, unless a co-trustee remains in
office."34
Category 1 beneficiaries (distributees or permissible distributees
of trust income or principal) are entitled to all of the rights of
Category 2 beneficiaries, plus one: they are entitled to receive a UTC
Trust Report "at least annually and at the termination of the trust"
whether or not they have requested it.35
The official comment to the UTC explains that the duty to
inform is focused primarily on beneficiaries with current or proximate
interests, and less on beneficiaries with remote interests, for two
reasons. First, trustees may have "difficulty ... identifying
beneficiaries whose interests are remote and contingent."36 Second,
such beneficiaries "are not likely to have much interest in the day-to-
day affairs of the trust. 37
The third question answered by the UTC is: To which trusts
does the duty to inform the beneficiaries apply?38 As with the UTC's
other fiduciary duties owed to beneficiaries, the duty to inform them
applies only to trusts that are or have become irrevocable.3 9 If a trust
is revocable, 0 the UTC provides that the trustee's fiduciary duties are
32. See id. § 813(b). Note that a beneficiary may "waive the right" to receive the UTC
Trust Report "or other information" and "with respect to future reports and other
information, may withdraw a waiver previously given." Id. § 813(d).
33. Id. § 813(c).
34. Id.
35. Id. The right of waiver is still applicable. See supra note 32.
36. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 cmt.
37. Id.
38. In considering which trusts are governed by the duty to inform, we must also note
that the UTC contains a transition rule. In general, the UTC applies to trusts "created
before, on, or after" the UTC's effective date. Id. § 1106(a)(1). There is an exception,
however, with respect to two aspects of the duty to inform: the notices normally required
after accepting a trusteeship or after obtaining knowledge of an irrevocable trust are not
required if the trustee accepts the trusteeship or if the trust is or becomes irrevocable prior
to the UTC's effective date. See id. § 813(e).
39. See English, supra note 1, at 188.
40. UTC section 603(a) originally provided that fiduciary duties are owed to the
settlor, not to the beneficiaries, while the trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity to
revoke the trust. Section 603(a) was amended in 2004 to place the capacity requirement in
brackets, indicating that "uniformity among the states on this issue is not essential ... 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 cmt.
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owed to the settlor, not to the beneficiaries." This is an application of
the maxim "the greater power includes the lesser. 4 2  The settlor's
greater power to revoke a revocable trust includes the lesser power to
control the revocable trust's administration.43 If a trust is or becomes
irrevocable, the UTC provides that the trustee's fiduciary obligations
run to the beneficiaries, and these obligations include the duty to
inform.
The fourth and last question is: To what extent may the terms of
an irrevocable trust eliminate or lessen the duty to inform?
We may pause to ask: Why would a settlor want to do this? A
well-intentioned settlor might be protecting young beneficiaries who
are unprepared for significant wealth. From Andrew Carnegie to
Warren Buffett, perceptive members of the ultra-rich have rightly
worried about the dangers of inheriting too much wealth, at least
without any supervision or strings attached.' An egoistic settlor, on
the other (dead) hand, might be hiding information in order to foist
his quirks and cronies onto subsequent generations. For an
illustration of the dangers of trust privacy, consider the allegations of
secrecy and mismanagement that surfaced in the recent disputes,
subsequently settled for multimillions, over the Pritzker family trusts
in Chicago.45 As experienced practitioners can attest, settlors good
and bad are in ample supply.
41. See id. § 603(a). The official comment is explicit that this rule applies to the duty
to inform: "Pursuant to this section, the duty under section 813 to inform and report to
beneficiaries is owed to the settlor of a revocable trust as long as the settlor has capacity."
Id. § 603 cmt.
The UTC's rule that fiduciary duties are not owed to the trust's beneficiaries while the
trust is revocable is open to criticism. Revocable trusts, unlike wills, are not ambulatory;
the trustee is engaged in the ongoing management of assets. Therefore, the trustee's
performance matters to the beneficiaries even while the trust is revocable. I thank John
Langbein for this point. It is worth noting that the newest state to adopt the UTC, North
Dakota, uniquely provides that the duty to inform is owed to the beneficiaries even while
the trust is revocable. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-13(8) (Supp. 2007) ("The duties of a
trustee specified in this section are not subject to section 59-14-03.").
42. Regarding the maxim, see, for example, United States v. Vega Figueroa, 984 F.
Supp. 71, 78 n.16 (D.P.R. 1997).
43. Cf. Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600 (111. 1955) (wherein the Illinois Supreme
Court tried unconvincingly to identify a fiduciary duty owed by the trustee to the
beneficiary of four revocable declarations of trust).
44. For further discussion, see Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and
the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 446-48 (2006).
45. See Susan Chandler & Kathy Bergen, Lawsuit Threat Led to Pritzker Split, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 9, 2005, at B2; Susan Chandler & Kathy Bergen, Inside the Pritzker Family
Feud, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 2005, at C1 (quoting an unnamed source that the settlement led
to "more transparency" in the management of family assets); William Neuman, Big Deal:
A New Condo for a Hotel Heiress (No, Not That One), N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, § 11, at
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Many rules of trust law are default rules; they yield to the terms
of the trust as expressed by the settlor.46 However, UTC section
105(b) lists fourteen points of trust law that cannot be overridden by
the settlor. Two of these concern the trustee's duty to inform. First,
section 105(b)(8) provides that, with respect to "qualified
beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust who have attained twenty-five
years of age," the settlor cannot narrow or eliminate the duty to
provide the notices normally required after the trustee accepts the
trusteeship or after the trustee obtains knowledge that the trust is or
has become irrevocable. 47 These notices concern the existence of the
trust, the identity of the trustee, and the beneficiary's right to UTC
Trust Reports.48 Second, section 105(b)(9) provides that the settlor
cannot restrict or waive the trustee's duty to respond to the request of
a beneficiary of an irrevocable trust for UTC Trust Reports and
"other information reasonably related" to the trust's administration.49
The effect of the first of these provisions is to link the mandatory
right to information to the age of the qualified beneficiary. Qualified
beneficiaries twenty-five years and older have greater rights to
information than qualified beneficiaries younger than twenty-five. As
the UTC comment explains, the provisions are designed to "respond[]
to the desire of some settlors that younger beneficiaries not know of
the trust's bounty until they have reached an age of maturity and self-
sufficiency., 50  The comment also reveals that the UTC drafting
committee considered but rejected a proposal to use the remoteness
of the beneficiary's interest, rather than the beneficiary's age, as the
relevant criterion for determining whether the right to information
should be mandatory or default law.5
The provisions making aspects of the duty to inform mandatory
have proven controversial. 52  NCCUSL responded in 2004 to the
2 (reporting that Liesel Pritzker received a $450 million settlement after suing her father,
Robert Pritzker, for allegedly "loot[ing] her trust funds").
46. See John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REV.
1105, 1105 (2004). On the distinction between mandatory rules and default rules, see T.P.
Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for Same-Sex Equality, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 1513, 1515 (1999).
47. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(8).
48. See id.
49. Id. § 105(b)(9).
50. Id. § 105 cmt.
51. Id. ("During the drafting of the Uniform Trust Code, the drafting committee
discussed and rejected a proposal that the ability of the settlor to waive required notice be
based on the nature of the beneficiaries' interest and not on the beneficiaries' age.").
52. Id. ("Sections 105(b)(8) and 105(b)(9) address the extent to which a settlor may
waive trustee notices and other disclosures to beneficiaries that would otherwise be
[Vol. 851604
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controversy by amending section 105, putting subsections (b)(8) and
(b)(9) in brackets, thereby "signal[ing] that uniformity is not
expected."53
B. An Example of Non-Uniformity: The North Carolina Trust Code
The North Carolina version of the UTC ("NCTC")54 departs
from the UTC's duty to inform in significant respects. In particular,
the first, second, and fourth questions addressed in Part L.A yield
noticeably different answers under the NCTC. We again consider
each of the questions in turn.
The first question is: To which beneficiaries does the trustee owe
a duty to inform? Under the NCTC, there is no duty to inform
beneficiaries in Category 3. The duty to inform runs only to
beneficiaries in Categories 1 and 2. Put differently: the NCTC limits
the duty to "qualified beneficiaries," a term defined the same as in
the UTC, hence encompassing the beneficiaries in Categories 1 and
2.11 The comment to the North Carolina statute recognizes, but does
not explain, the exclusion of Category 3 beneficiaries.5 6 It may be
that this was done to enhance the trust's privacy with respect to
remote beneficiaries and/or to reduce the burden on the trustee.
The second question is: To which information is a beneficiary
entitled? Here, the NCTC differs from the UTC in five respects.
First, there is no distinction made between beneficiaries in Category 1
versus those in Category 2. Instead, all "qualified beneficiaries" are
treated alike for purposes of the duty to inform. Second, the qualified
beneficiaries are entitled to receive information only "upon
request."57  There is no duty to send information to a qualified
beneficiary who has not requested it. Third, if a qualified beneficiary
has made a request, the information that must be provided is as
follows: the qualified beneficiary is entitled "at reasonable times [to]
required under the Code. These subsections have generated more discussion in
jurisdictions considering enactment of the UTC than have any other provisions of the
Code."). For a sense of the debate, compare Donald D. Kozusko, In Defense of Quiet
Trusts, 143 TR. & EST. 20 (2004), with Robert Whitman, Full Disclosure is Best, 143 TR. &
EST. 59 (2004).
53. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 cmt.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36C-1-101 to -11-1106 (2005).
55. See id. § 36C-103(15); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(13). Note that the option under
UTC section 110(a) for a nonqualified beneficiary to request to receive notices as if the
beneficiary were a qualified beneficiary has been deleted from section 36C-1-110 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-1-110.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-813 N.C. cmt.
57. Id. § 36C-8-813(a).
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complete and accurate information as to the nature and amount of
trust property and ... to inspect the subject matter of the trust and
the accounts and other documents relating to the trust. '58  The
comment to the North Carolina statute explains that the UTC's
language was rejected as "too general" and that the NCTC text is
drawn from section 173 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.59
Fourth, the NCTC provides a safe harbor for trustees. The duty to
inform is "considered to have [been] discharged" if the trustee sends
a report "at least annually and at termination of the trust to the
beneficiary that describes the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and
disbursements, including the source and amount of the trustee's
compensation, and lists the trust assets and their respective market
values, including estimated values of assets with uncertain values"
(referred to in this Article as a "North Carolina Trust Report").6"
The NCTC emphasizes, however, that the duty to inform does not
necessarily require this much information: "No presumption shall
arise that a trustee who [does not provide this annual report] ...
failed to discharge the trustee's duty . ... "61 Fifth, the duty to inform
a qualified beneficiary of a transaction attaches only after the
transaction has been made. No beneficiary is entitled to information
"in advance of transactions relating to the trust property."62  This
differs from the UTC, which requires qualified beneficiaries to be
notified "in advance of any change in the method or rate of the
58. Id. Note, for example, that the NCTC has deleted the duty under UTC section
813(b)(2) to inform qualified beneficiaries of the trustee's name, address, and telephone
number within sixty days after accepting a trusteeship. Similarly, the NCTC has deleted
the duty under UTC section 813(b)(3) to inform qualified beneficiaries within sixty days
after the trustee knows of the creation of an irrevocable trust or knows that a formerly
revocable trust has become irrevocable "of the trust's existence, of the right to request a
copy of the trust instrument, and of the right to a trustee's report ...." See id. § 36C-8-
813. The comment to the North Carolina statute explains that these UTC provisions were
not adopted because they would "impose new and unnecessary burdens on the trustee not
previously recognized in North Carolina." Id. § 36C-8-813 N.C. cmt.
59. See id. § 36C-8-813 N.C. cmt. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides:
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to give him upon his request at
reasonable times complete and accurate information as to the nature and amount
of the trust property, and to permit him to inspect the subject matter of the trust
and the accounts and vouchers and other documents relating to the trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-813(b)(2).
61. Id. Note that the report is also unnecessary if there is a change in trusteeship;
North Carolina did not adopt the second sentence of UTC section 813(c). See id. § 36C-8-
813 N.C. cmt.
62. Id. § 36C-8-813(b)(1).
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trustee's compensation. 6 3 As in some other instances that we have
already observed, the comment to the North Carolina statute notes,
but does not explain, the departure from the UTC. 4
The third question is: To which trusts does the duty to inform
the beneficiaries apply? Here, the NCTC tracks the UTC in limiting
this duty to trusts that are or have become irrevocable. As long as the
trust is revocable, the trustee's fiduciary duties, including the duty to
inform, are owed to the settlor, not to the beneficiaries.65
The fourth and last question is: To what extent may the settlor
of an irrevocable trust waive or modify the duty to inform? Unlike
the UTC, the NCTC provides that no aspect of the duty to inform is
mandatory.66 The settlor of the trust has "the right to override any
duty to provide information., 67 This rule reflects language found in,
but is arguably broader than the holding of, North Carolina's one
reported judicial decision on the duty to inform68: the 1997 case of
Taylor v. NationsBank Corporation.69 The case concerned an action
by the beneficiaries of a trust against the trustees in order to obtain a
copy of the trust instrument and all documents relating to the trust.
63. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(b)(4).
64. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-813 N.C. cmt.
65. See id. § 36C-6-603. Note that the NCTC has a slightly different transition rule
from the UTC. The basic rule is the same: the NCTC, like the UTC, applies to "any
express trust ... wherever and however created." Id. § 36C-1-102; see UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 102. There is an exception for two provisions of the NCTC relating to the duty to
inform: first, the provision in section 36C-8-813(b)(1) that the duty does not include
providing information in advance of transactions; and second, the provision in section
36C-8-813(b)(2) that a trustee is deemed to have fulfilled the duty to inform with a North
Carolina Trust Report (but that the failure to send such a report does not create a
presumption of a breach of the duty). These provisions apply "only to a trust created
under a trust instrument executed on or after" the NCTC's effective date of January 1,
2006. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-813(d).
66. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-1-105. Note that UTC section 105(b)(8) and section
105(b)(9) have been deleted. See id.
67. Id. § 36C-1-105 N.C. cmt. Note, however, that North Carolina has adopted the
UTC's mandatory rule that a "trust and its terms must be for the benefit of the
beneficiaries." UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(3), 404; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36C-1-
105(b)(3), 36C-4-404. For discussion of this benefit-the-beneficiaries requirement, see
Langbein, supra note 46, at 1112.
68. The case treats the issue as one of first impression. Lexis and Westlaw searches,
and research in West's North Carolina Digest 2d, failed to locate any other North Carolina
cases on the duty to inform. The one treatise on North Carolina trust law in the law
library at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is a typewritten book, authored
and privately published and sold by a former dean of the law school at Wake Forest
University. See ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TRUSTS (6th ed. 1977).
This treatise addresses the duty to inform only in passing, by quoting section 173 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts; it mentions no statutes or cases from North Carolina. See
id. at 114.
69. 125 N.C. App. 515,481 S.E.2d 358 (1997).
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The settlor, during his lifetime, had orally instructed the trustees to
keep the trusts confidential. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina
held that any override of the duty to inform must appear in the
language of the trust itself:
We hold that absent an explicit provision in the trust to the
contrary, plaintiffs as trust beneficiaries are entitled to view the
trust instrument from which their interest is derived .... The
wish[] of the settlor to keep certain terms of the trust secret is
understandable; however, absent an explicit provision in the
trust instrument to the contrary, the trustee has a duty to reveal
the terms of the trust to the beneficiaries.7 °
The court also stated that the beneficiaries were entitled to
information "reasonably necessary to enable [them] to enforce [their]
rights under the trust or to prevent or redress a breach of trust"; this
gave them the right to see the then-current version of the trust
instrument but not to view earlier versions no longer operative.7
C. Non- Uniformity in Other UTC Jurisdictions
North Carolina is not alone in making significant modifications
to the UTC's duty to inform. Of the other states (and the District of
Columbia) adopting enough of the UTC to be counted as "UTC
jurisdictions,"72 all have amended the UTC's provisions on the duty to
inform.73 Addressing each state's amendments, some of which are
unique, is beyond the scope of this Article. Doing so is also
unnecessary because the Uniform Law Commission maintains a Web
site with charts describing the specific variations in each state's
version of the UTC.74 Still, the general observation can be made that
the amendments to the duty take four principal forms.
70. Id. at 521-22, 481 S.E.2d at 362.
71. Id. at 521, 481 S.E.2d at 362.
72. The list of enacting jurisdictions is available on the NCCUSL Web site. Uniform
Law Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2007). A description of
the non-uniform amendments made by the first ten states to enact the UTC can be found
in Millard, supra note 1, at 384-91.
73. The article by Kevin Millard states that "Nebraska and New Mexico adopted
section 813 . .. without change." Millard, supra note 1, at 384. This is no longer correct.
New Mexico has not adopted UTC section 813(e), and Nebraska has added a new
subsection (e) and codified UTC section 813(e) as subsection (f). See NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 30-3878 (Supp. 2006); N.M. STAT. § 46A-8-813 (2003).
74. UTCproject.org, http://www.utcproject.org (follow "Updated UTC Enactment
Charts" hyperlinks under "The Latest") (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
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The first and most common amendment is that the treatment of
the duty to inform as a mandatory rule has been modified 71 or
eliminated16 in all but one 77 of the UTC jurisdictions. This
amendment renders more or all of the duty a default rule that can be
waived by the settlor if the settlor so provides in the trust instrument.
Second, some of the states narrow the beneficiaries to whom the
duty is owed. This is typically done by limiting the duty to "qualified
beneficiaries. 7 1 It must also be noted that some states define this
term more narrowly than does the UTC.7 9
Third, some of the states limit the information owed to the
beneficiary. This is sometimes, though not always, done by requiring
the beneficiary's request for information to be narrowed to a single
trust.80
75. See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-105(b)(8) (Supp. 2006); D.C. CODE § 19-1301.05 (Supp.
2006); FLA. STAT. § 736.0105 (Supp. 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105 (Supp.
2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.1-105 (West Supp. 2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(b)(8)
(Supp. 2006); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5801.04 (LexisNexis 2006); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 130.020 (2005). Pennsylvania has modified the duty, see 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7780.3
(Supp. 2006), but the duty is mandatory. Id. § 7705(b)(8).
76. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-105 (Supp. 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-105
(Supp. 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-105 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-09-05
(Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-105 (Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-105
(Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-105 (Supp. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-541.05
(Supp. 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-105 (2005).
77. The one state retaining UTC section 105(b)(8)-(9) is New Mexico. See N.M.
STAT. § 46A-1-105 (2003).
78. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0110, 736.0813 (Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58a-
110, -813 (Supp. 2006) (note also the limitation of the duty to the surviving spouse if the
conditions in section 58a-813(d) are met); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, §§ 110, 813
(Supp. 2006) (except for the right to request a copy of the trust instrument); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 130.040, 130.710 (2005) (focusing duty on qualified beneficiaries but providing
that trustee "may" respond to a nonqualified beneficiary if the request is "reasonable
under the circumstances"; note also the limitation of the duty to the surviving spouse if the
conditions in section 130.710(8) are met); UTAH CODE ANN, § 75-7-811 (Supp. 2006)
(note also that Utah has not codified section 110 of the UTC); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-
110 (2005) (allowing nonqualified beneficiary to be treated as qualified "before the death
of the settlor" only with "the written consent of the settler"; after the settlor's death,
written request for notice suffices "unless the terms of the trust specify otherwise"); id.
§ 4-10-813.
79. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-103(12) (Supp. 2006) (excluding from the
definition permissible distributees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 103(12) (Supp.
2006) (requiring that a qualified beneficiary be "living" and excluding from the definition
any "contingent distributee ... or a contingent permissible distributee of trust income or
principal whose interest in the trust is not reasonably expected to vest"); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 4-10-103(a)(xv) (2005) (limiting the definition to beneficiaries "currently entitled
to distributions of income or principal from the trust or [having] a vested remainder
interest in the residuary of the trust which is not subject to divestment").
80. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.8-813(6) (West Supp. 2007) ("The request of any
beneficiary for information under any provision of this section shall be with respect to a
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Fourth and last, some jurisdictions permit the settlor to name a
substitute entitled to information in lieu of the beneficiaries.8" I shall
have more to say about this device, and whether it is a truly adequate
alternative, in Part II below.
II. NORMATIVE EXPLORATIONS
This second part of the Article moves from descriptive to
normative analysis. The analysis focuses on the central questions:
should there be a duty to inform and, if so, should it be mandatory or
default law?
A. A Duty to Inform?: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Should trust law contain a duty to inform? This question can
usefully be answered by bringing to bear the insights from two
interdisciplinary perspectives: legal history and law and economics.
The history of English and American law reveals that the duty to
inform has a venerable pedigree dating back nearly two centuries.
The economic analysis of law demonstrates that the duty to inform
continues to serve a crucial function within the law of trusts.
1. Legal History
The duty to inform has been a part of the Anglo-American law
of trusts at least from the first half of the nineteenth century. As
English barrister John Walpole Willis observed in his 1827 A Practical
Treatise on the Duties and Responsibilities of Trustees, it is "the
especial duty of a trustee, to obtain, and afford accurate information
to his [beneficiary] of the disposition of the trust property. 82 The
single trust that is sufficiently identified to enable the trustee to locate the records of the
trust."); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.710(6) (2005) ("A beneficiary's request for any information
under this section must be with respect to a single trust that is sufficiently identified to
enable the trustee to locate the trust's records."). For a different type of limitation, see
TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-813 (Supp. 2006) (giving the trustee "absolute discretion" over
whether to send the entire trust instrument or an abstract, yet also requiring the trustee to
"promptly respond" to requests for information "[u]nless unreasonable under the
circumstances"); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-548.13(A) (Supp. 2007) (providing that a trustee
"shall not be subject to removal or other sanctions" for failure to furnish information or to
respond to a request for information if the trustee believes in good faith "that to do so
would be ... contrary to the purposes of the settlor").
81. See D.C. CODE § 19-1301.05(c) (Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0306, 736.0813(3)
(Supp. 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(3) (Supp. 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 456.1-105(3) (West Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5801.04(C) (LexisNexis
2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020(3) (2005).
82. JOHN WALPOLE WILLIS, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRUSTEES 125 (1827).
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same point was made by James Hill, barrister and fellow of New
College, Oxford, who stated in his 1845 A Practical Treatise on the
Law Relating to Trustees that it is "the duty of trustees to give their
[beneficiaries] full information as to the disposition and investment of
the trust property."83 To support these propositions, Willis and Hill
each cited one case': Walker v. Symonds 5 an 1818 decision of the
Court of Chancery. Walker appears to have become a leading case on
this point of law.86 The facts of Walker are as follows.87 Two co-
trustees, Symonds and Griffith, allowed their third co-trustee,
Donnythorne, to manage the investment of the trust assets.
Donnythorne told them that he would invest in bills of the East India
Company. He did so, but in bills payable to himself. When the bills
came due, the Company paid Donnythorne. Soon thereafter,
Donnythorne died insolvent. The beneficiaries sued the co-trustees
for breach of trust. During the litigation, the court learned that
Symonds and Griffith had made no attempts over a period of more
than four years to find out how Donnythorne had invested the assets.
Lord Chancellor Eldon held the co-trustees responsible for the loss.
In the course of his opinion, Eldon made the following statement:
It is the duty of trustees to afford to their [beneficiaries]
accurate information of the disposition of the trust-fund; all the
information of which they are, or ought to be, in possession: a
trustee may involve himself in serious difficulty, by want of the
information which it was his duty to obtain.88
No later than the middle of the nineteenth century, the idea was
established that trustees owe beneficiaries a duty to provide
information. Barrister Thomas Lewin was emphatic in the 1857
edition of his A Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees:
"As an incident to the beneficial enjoyment of his interest by the
[beneficiary], he has a right to call upon the trustee for accurate
information as to the state of the trust."8 9 Indeed, the duty to furnish
information to the beneficiary appears in Lewin's index under
83. JAMES HILL, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO TRUSTEES,
THEIR POWERS, DUTIES, PRIVILEGES, AND LIABILITIES 382 (1845).
84. See WILLIS, supra note 82, at 125 n.24; HILL, supra note 83, at 382 n.y.
85. (1818) 3 Swanst. 1, 36 Eng. Rep. 751 (Ch.).
86. The English treatise author Thomas Lewin referred to it as "a case of great
importance to trustees in general." THOMAS LEWIN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 276 (1st ed. 1837).
87. A good summary can be found in LEWIN, supra note 86, at 276-79.
88. 3 Swanst. at 59, 36 Eng. Rep. at 772.
89. THOMAS LEWIN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES 599 (3d ed. 1857).
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"Duties of Trustees," along with other fiduciary responsibilities such
as the duty of care, the duty of proper investment, and the duty of
impartiality.9"
English cases were often well known to, and influential for,
nineteenth-century American lawyers.9' Consider one of the leading
American treatises on trust law in the first half of the nineteenth
century, Joseph Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence.
Citing Walker, Story wrote that "it is the duty of the trustee ... to
afford accurate information to the [beneficiary] of the disposition of
the trust-property; and if he has not all the proper information, to
seek for it and if practicable to obtain it."92 In the late nineteenth
century, one of the leading American treatises on trust law was Jairus
Ware Perry's Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees, published in
seven editions from 1872 to 1929. Citing Walker among other cases,
the treatise declared the beneficiary's right to information: "Where
the relation of trustee[] and [beneficiary] is admitted or clearly
established, the [beneficiaries], as the true owners of the fund, have
the right to the production and inspection of all the documents and
papers relating to it."
93
Turning to the twentieth century, we consistently find the duty to
inform in the leading summary of American trust law, the
megatreatise 94 on The Law of Trusts originally authored by Austin
Wakeman Scott. The first edition, published in 1939, stated in
pertinent part:
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to give them
upon their request at reasonable times complete and accurate
information as to the administration of the trust. The
beneficiaries are entitled to know what the trust property is and
how the trustee has dealt with it. They are entitled to examine
the trust property and the accounts and vouchers and other
90. See id. at 963.
91. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 69 (3d ed. 2005).
92. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 619 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 1886). This
edition restored the text and footnotes of the 1846 fourth edition, the last edition prepared
by Story himself. See l id. at vii.
93. JAIRUS WARE PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 822 (George F. Choate ed., 1882).
94. On the phenomenon of the megatreatise, see John H. Langbein, Scholarly and
Professional Objectives in Legal Education: American Trends and English Comparisons,
in 2 PRESSING PROBLEMS IN THE LAW: WHAT ARE LAW SCHOOLS FOR? 1, 2 (P.B.H.
Birks ed., 1996). On the history of the legal treatise, see generally A.W.B. Simpson, The
Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 632 (1981).
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documents relating to the trust and its administration. Where a
trust is created for several beneficiaries, each of them is entitled
to information as to the trust. Where the trust is created in
favor of successive beneficiaries, a beneficiary who has a future
interest under the trust, as well as a beneficiary who is presently
entitled to receive income, is entitled to such information,
whether his interest is vested or contingent.95
The same propositions are carried forward into the most recent
edition, co-authored by the late William Franklin Fratcher with
supplements and a new edition in progress by Mark L. Ascher.96
The duty to inform is also emphasized in America's other
megatreatise on trust law, George Gleason Bogert's The Law of
Trusts and Trustees.97 In the Revised Second Edition, we read:
The beneficiary is the equitable owner of the trust property,
in whole or in part. The trustee is a mere representative whose
function is to attend to the safety of the trust property and to
obtain its avails for the beneficiary in the manner provided by
the trust instrument. That the settlor has created a trust and
thus required that the beneficiary enjoy his property interest
indirectly does not imply that the beneficiary is to be kept in
ignorance of the trust, the nature of the trust property and the
details of its administration. If the beneficiary is to be able to
hold the trustee to proper standards of care and honesty and to
obtain the benefits to which the trust instrument and doctrines
of equity entitle him, he must know of what the trust property
consists and how it is being managed.
From these considerations it follows that the trustee has the
duty to inform the beneficiary of important matters concerning
the trust and that the beneficiary is entitled to demand of the
trustee all information about the trust and its execution for
which he has any reasonable use."
In addition to featuring prominently in treatises, the duty to inform
has consistently received the imprimatur of the American Law
95. AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 173 (1939).
96. See AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 173 (4th ed. 1987). For updated footnotes and a discussion of the UTC, see
MARK L. ASCHER & MARGIT T. RIGNEY, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 173 (4th ed. Supp. 2006).
97. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (rev. 2d ed. 1983).
98. Id. § 961.
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Institute in its Restatements of the Law.99 The first Restatement of
Trusts, promulgated in 1935, stated in pertinent part:
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to give him upon
his request at reasonable times complete and accurate
information as to the nature and amount of the trust property,
and to permit him or a person duly authorized by him to inspect
the subject matter of the trust and the accounts and vouchers
and other documents relating to the trust.'00
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts, promulgated in 1959,101 and
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, now nearing completion,1 2 each
reaffirm the importance and vitality of the duty to inform.
Finally, the duty to inform has been endorsed by NCCUSL since
the first promulgation of the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") in
1969. Section 7-303 of the UPC requires the trustee to "keep the
99. On the Restatements as a combination of reform and summary, see N.E.H. Hull,
Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute,
8 LAW & HIST. REV. 55 (1990).
100. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 173 (1935). On the strong connection between
Austin Scott's treatise and the First and Second Restatements, for which Scott served as
Reporter, see Langbein, supra note 94, at 3 ("Scott's treatise on Trusts is so tightly
organized around the Restatement that it even employs common section numbering.").
101. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides:
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to give him upon his request and at
reasonable times complete and accurate information as to the nature and amount
of the trust property, and to permit him or a person duly authorized by him to
inspect the subject matter of the trust and the accounts and vouchers and other
documents relating to the trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959).
102. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides:
(1) Except as provided in § 74 (revocable trusts) or as permissibly modified by the
terms of the trust, a trustee has a duty: (a) promptly to inform fairly
representative beneficiaries of the existence of the trust, of their status as
beneficiaries and their right to obtain further information, and of basic
information concerning the trusteeship; (b) to inform beneficiaries of significant
changes in their beneficiary status; and (c) to keep fairly representative
beneficiaries reasonably informed of changes involving the trusteeship and about
other significant developments concerning the trust and its administration,
particularly material information needed by beneficiaries for the protection of
their interests.
(2) Except as provided in § 74 or as permissibly modified by the terms of the trust,
a trustee also ordinarily has a duty promptly to respond to the request of any
beneficiary for information concerning the trust and its administration, and to
permit beneficiaries on a reasonable basis to inspect trust documents, records,
and property holdings.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 (2007).
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beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed of the trust and its
administration." 1
03
The history of the duty to inform shows that Anglo-American
trust law has regularly recognized a duty in the trustee to provide
information to the trust's beneficiaries.
2. Economic Analysis
The importance of the trustee's duty to inform rests on more
than the doctrine's history. History is helpful, but it cannot justify a
rule that has become outmoded." 4 The insights of law and economics
demonstrate why the duty to inform remains a vital aspect of modern
trust law.
The essential structure of the trust, dividing ownership between
one or more trustees holding legal title and one or more beneficiaries
holding equitable title, presents a classic problem. The powers of
trust administration are held by the trustees, who have no personal
stake in the effect of their decisions on the trust corpus; conversely,
the beneficiaries who do bear the risk of asset loss have no control
over the trust's administration. In the literature and language'015 of
law and economics, this is known as the problem of agency cost. 0 6 As
Professor Sitkoff explained in a recent article, agency problems arise
"when one party (the agent) has discretionary and unobservable
decisionmaking authority that affects the wealth of another party (the
103. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-303 (amended 1998), 8 U.L.A. 519 (1998 & Supp.
2006). In addition to this general duty, the UPC requires the following:
(a) Within 30 days after his acceptance of the trust, the trustee shall inform in
writing the current beneficiaries and if possible, one or more persons who under
section 1-403 may represent beneficiaries with future interests, of the Court in
which the trust is registered and of his name and address. (b) Upon reasonable
request, the trustee shall provide the beneficiary with a copy of the terms of the
trust which describe or affect his interest and with relevant information about the
assets of the trust and the particulars relating to the administration. (c) Upon
reasonable request, a beneficiary is entitled to a statement of the accounts of the
trust annually and on termination of the trust or change of the trustee.
Id.
104. See T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513,
529-48 (2003).
105. "Agency" is not used here in its legal sense, requiring the agent to be subject to
the principal's control. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
106. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE
LAW 7, 7-8 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993).
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principal)." 7  The agent's incentives are not aligned with the
principal's incentives because it is the principal's wealth, not the
agent's, at stake, and the agent's actions are not fully transparent to
the principal. The result is that the agent will not work as hard as he
would do if he were also the principal-indeed, the agent may even
breach his duties to the principal. The losses that result from this
misalignment of incentives are known in the law and economics
literature as agency costs.
A partial solution to the problem of agency cost is to give the
agent a financial incentive to act in the interests of the principal, for
example by linking the agent's compensation to the principal's gains
and losses. Yet this solution is incomplete because there is still not a
perfect alignment of the principal's interests with those of the agent,
for two reasons. First, the agent and principal may have different
tolerances for risk; in such an event, the agent's financial stake creates
an incentive for the agent to act according to his own risk preferences
rather than those of the principal. 8 Second, the agent's financial
stake will always be limited, with the result that the agent's interests
and the principal's will never fully converge. As Professor Sitkoff
rightly noted, "no compensation scheme short of transferring
complete ownership of the project to the agent will solve the
incentive problem in all possible scenarios when the agent's efforts
are unobservable."'' 0 9
This last phrase is the key: when the agent's efforts are
unobservable. An important additional measure to align the
incentives of the agent with those of the principal is to reduce the
extent to which the agent's decisions are hidden."' 0 Put differently:
the more the agent's decisions are known to (or discoverable by) the
principal, the more likely it is that the agent will choose to act in the
principal's best interests.
This is the role of the duty to inform. It helps to align the
interests of the trustee with those of the beneficiaries by shedding
light on the otherwise hidden decisions made by the trustee in the
course of trust administration. Providing this information is
107. Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
621, 636 (2004).
108. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent
Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming Nov.
2007) (manuscript at 11 n.20, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
109. Sitkoff, supra note 107, at 637.
110. For a good textbook treatment of the economic problem of hidden action by an
agent, see PIERRE CAHUC & ANDRE ZYLBERBERG, LABOR ECONOMICS 323-28 (2004).
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important in order to reduce agency costs and thereby achieve trust
management in the best interests of the beneficiaries. The duty to
inform deters the trustee from committing a breach of fiduciary duty
by giving the beneficiaries access to the information needed to
monitor the trustee's performance. The duty also assists the
beneficiaries in remedying a fiduciary breach after it has occurred by
giving them the information needed to prove the breach. Providing
the information to the beneficiaries is important because (if we return
to the language of economic analysis) they are the principals; the
assets at stake are theirs."' The beneficiaries, and only the
beneficiaries," 2 have the full incentive to supervise and enforce the
trustee's fiduciary obligations.
B. Mandatory or Default?
If we accept the insight from law and economics that trust law
should continue to contain a duty to inform, the most important and
contentious" 3 question is whether the duty should be framed at least
to some extent as a mandatory rule, as in the UTC, or wholly as a
default rule, as in North Carolina.
1. The Duty as a Mandatory Rule
The starting point for our analysis must be the fundamental
principle, articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Property, that the
intention of the donor controls "the meaning of a donative document
... [and] is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.''.4
Rules governing a donative document must yield to the expressed
intention of the donor except where necessary. This fundamental
principle begins, but hardly ends, the inquiry because it does not tell
us how to know whether a particular rule of trust law is necessary
despite the donor's expression of contrary intention. Put differently:
the presumption in the Restatement (Third) of Property in favor of
111. This discussion is focused on a trust that is or has become irrevocable. As noted
earlier, see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text, the UTC's principle (which is
subject to criticism) is that the trustee of a revocable trust owes fiduciary duties only to the
settlor, not to the beneficiaries.
112. On whether the settlor of, or a third party to, an irrevocable trust can be an
adequate substitute with respect to the receipt of information, see infra notes 147-66 and
accompanying text.
113. English, supra note 1, at 202 ("The most discussed issue during the drafting of the
UTC and subsequent to its approval is the extent to which a settlor may waive the above
disclosure requirements.").
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 (2003).
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default rules does not itself tell us when a particular rule of trust law
should be mandatory. This requires a theory of mandatory rules in
the law of trusts.
When should a rule of trust law be mandatory? The answer to
this question is connected to an ongoing debate about the very
essence of the trust. The debate has been described in detail in recent
scholarship,'1 5 so only a brief summary is needed here. Put simply,
the issue is whether trusts are primarily contractual or proprietary.
Contractarians view the trust as primarily a contract between the
settlor and the trustee, with the trust's beneficiaries occupying a
position akin to contractual third-party beneficiaries' 16 (or in
Professor Sitkoff's phrase drawn from organizational law, "residual
claimants"" 7). Proprietarian scholars characterize the trust and the
role of the trustee as essentially "property-based, "118 arising from a
conveyance, not a contract." 9 It is important to emphasize that these
positions are not all-or-nothing; 20 participants in the debate recognize
that trusts combine contractual and proprietary features.'
Nonetheless, scholars have taken positions placing more emphasis on
contract or property, respectively.
The position one takes in the debate about the predominant
features of the trust seems to influence one's view about the proper
role of default and mandatory rules in trust law. Contractarians tend
to prefer default rules except in comparatively narrow circumstances,
thereby giving the settlor maximum flexibility to structure the terms
115. See Sitkoff, supra note 107, at 627-33.
116. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE L.J. 625, 627 (1995).
117. See Sitkoff, supra note 107, at 646.
118. Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 & n.7 (2000).
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1959); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5(i) & cmt. i (2003).
120. A third view, critical of contractarianism yet perhaps not fundamentally
proprietarian, has been articulated by Professor Leslie, who argues that treating fiduciary
duties as default rules weakens their moral force and renders their content more difficult
to discern. See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of
Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 89 (2005) (examining the duties of care and loyalty but not
the duty to inform).
121. See Langbein, supra note 116, at 669 ("Trust is a hybrid of contract and property,
and acknowledging contractarian elements does not require disregarding property
components whose convenience abides."); see also Sitkoff, supra note 107, at 633 ("[Tlhe
law of trusts, like the law of other organizations, offers a careful blending of in rem and in
personam features.").
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of the bargain with the trustee.2 2 Proprietarians tend to be more
willing to use mandatory rules that impinge upon the wishes of the
settlor in order to protect the property rights held by the
beneficiary. 123
A comprehensive theory of mandatory rules in trust law has
recently been articulated by Professor Langbein,2 4 who has advanced
the contractarian view of the trust in other scholarship. 125 According
to Professor Langbein, trust rules should be mandatory only if they fit
into one (or more) of three categories. First, rules of trust law should
be mandatory if they "rest on self-evident principles of legal process
that are broadly shared with the rest of private law" or are aimed at
preventing "illegal purposes.' 2 6 Examples include limitations on the
settlor's power to "enlarge or diminish the rights of creditors or other
third parties" or to establish a trust "to overthrow the government or
to sell dope or to operate a bordello." '27 Second, rules of trust law
should be mandatory if needed to prevent the settlor from imposing
"manifestly value-impairing restrictions on the use or disposition of
the trust property."'28  Examples here include restrictions on trust
investments or on the modification of trusts when circumstances
change. Third and last, rules of trust law can be mandatory if they are
fundamentally "intent-implementing." '29 An example is the rule that
the settlor cannot waive the trustee's duty to act in good faith. 3 ' A
settlor who has chosen to use the trust form must intend to require
the trustee to act in good faith.
122. "This Article's normative claim is that the law should minimize the agency
costs inherent in locating managerial authority with the trustee (T) and the residual
claim with the beneficiaries (B1 and B2), but only to the extent that doing so is
consistent with the ex ante instructions of the settlor (S)." Sitkoff, supra note 107, at 624
(emphasis added); see also Langbein, supra note 46, at 1126 ("Trust law consists
almost entirely of default rules. The mandatory rules barely intrude on ordinary
practice.").
123. This is particularly true of English trust law, which views the irrevocable trust as
"the beneficiaries' property, not as the settlor's property." JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY
M. JOHANSON, JAMES LINDGREN & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
573 (7th ed. 2005). Under English law, the duty to inform is essentially mandatory. See
David Hayton, The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship, in TRENDS IN
CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAw 47,49-56 (A.J. Oakley ed., 1996).
124. See Langbein, supra note 46.
125. See Langbein, supra note 116, at 627 ("[Tlhe deal between settlor and trustee is
functionally indistinguishable from the modern third-party beneficiary contract. Trusts
are contracts.").
126. Langbein, supra note 46, at 1107.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1109.
129. Id. at 1119.
130. See id. at 1124.
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Professor Langbein defends the decision of the UTC's drafters to
make mandatory some aspects of the duty to inform by arguing that
the duty is intent-implementing.131 As he explains, a mandatory duty
to inform is "protective" and thus implements the settlor's true intent
because a trust in which there is no duty to inform is one in which
"the trustee's misuse of the trust property [is] beyond effective
remedy." '132
I agree with the conclusion that the duty to inform should be
partially mandatory but disagree with the explanation that the duty is
intent-effectuating. Mandatory rules are not intent-effectuating; they
are intent-defeating.133 The terms as conventionally understood refer
to the intent of the non-conforming donor. A rule may be consistent
with what most donors want, but the defining question is whether a
non-conforming donor is required to accept it. If a rule is mandatory,
it has defeated the intention of the non-conforming donor. An
example is the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. 134 Some,
perhaps many, donors establishing contingent future interests create
ones that are certain to vest or fail within a life in being plus twenty-
one years. 135 The analysis, however, focuses on the non-conforming
donor. The Rule applies to him equally, not because it is intent-
implementing but because there are sound reasons for it to be intent-
defeating. True, some mandatory rules are more intent-defeating
than others. A mandatory rule consistent with the intention of eighty
percent of donors is, in a sense, less intent-defeating than one
consistent with the intention of ten percent of donors. The level of
popular support can be important as a political matter, when
attempting to persuade a legislature to enact or retain a mandatory
rule. But a mandatory rule is still intent-defeating for the non-
131. See id. at 1125-26.
132. Id. at 1126.
133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 16.3 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004) ("Rules of law and rules of
construction stem from entirely different premises. Rules of law are intent-defeating;
rules of construction are intent-effecting. Defeating intention is only justified to vindicate
goals of public policy.").
134. On the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities as a mandatory rule, see Gallanis,
supra note 104, at 549, 555; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (2003).
135. For the classic statement of the common-law Rule, see JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY,
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (2d ed. 1906). For an empirical study
suggesting that many trusts terminate prior to the end of what would be the perpetuity
period, see Mary Louise Fellows, Testing Perpetuity Reforms: A Study of Perpetuity Cases,
1984-1989,25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 597 (1991).
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conforming donor, and there are settlors who wish to be non-
conforming with respect to the duty to inform.
Given that the duty to inform is not intent-effectuating for non-
conforming settlors, is there a rationale for it that would justify it as a
mandatory rule? Or should the duty be a default rule waivable in the
bargain between settlor and trustee? This Article advances the view
that one does not need to frame the duty to inform as intent-
implementing in order to support it as a mandatory rule. An
additional basis on which a rule of trust law should be mandatory is
where the rule is needed to safeguard the equitable property interests
of the beneficiaries and (this is the same thing, phrased differently) to
monitor the performance, and enforce the fiduciary obligations, of
the trustee. The trustee has a mandatory duty to inform the
beneficiaries because only they have both the financial incentive and
legal authority136 to fulfill the monitoring and enforcement functions.
The link between the beneficiaries' interest and a mandatory rule
limiting the settlor's authority over the trust's administration is fully
in line with the direction of American trust law. The modern law of
fiduciary administration enforces a proprietarian boundary on the
settlor's contractarian power. The settlor of an irrevocable trust is
given significant room to control the trustee's actions but cannot
dispense with the core responsibility of the trustee to administer the
trust in the interests of the beneficiaries. This is readily illustrated by
examining the point of direct tension between settlors and
beneficiaries on fiduciary administration, namely the application of
the doctrine of administrative deviation, which governs the
beneficiaries' authority to insist that the trustee deviate from the
trust's administrative instructions.137 The traditional leading case is
136. On the legal standing of the settlor of a private irrevocable trust, see Michael R.
Houston, Comment, Estate of Wall v. Commissioner: An Answer to Settlor Standing in
Trust Law?, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1723 (2005). Contractarian scholars have argued that trust
law should be changed to permit settlors to sue for fiduciary breach. See, e.g., Langbein,
supra note 116, at 664; see also Sitkoff, supra note 107, at 668-69 (discussing settlor
standing in terms of agency costs). Settlor standing is an incomplete answer, however. As
the agency cost analysis demonstrates, only the beneficiaries (as the principals, in
economic language) have the full incentive to monitor and enforce the trustee's proper
performance.
137. The related doctrine of equitable deviation, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 66(1) (2007), which can be used to modify the trust's dispositive or
administrative provisions in light of unanticipated circumstances and in accordance with
the settlor's probable intention, can be useful in situations where it applies. The point of
the discussion, however, is to demonstrate that trust doctrine authorizes administrative
deviation irrespective of the settlor's intention in order to protect the property interests of
the beneficiaries.
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Matter of Pulitzer,138 decided in 1931. The terms of a trust established
by Joseph Pulitzer instructed the trustees not to sell the trust's stock
in the New York World newspaper. When the paper lost value, so did
the stock. The court authorized the sale on the ground that the
settlor, if alive, would have approved: "A man of his sagacity and
business ability could not have intended that from mere vanity, the
publication of the newspapers, with which his name and efforts had
been associated, should be persisted in until the entire trust asset was
destroyed or wrecked by bankruptcy or dissolution."' 39 The rationale
was the imputed approval of the settlor. Under modern American
law, however, the settlor's approval, actual or imputed, is not needed.
Section 412(b) of the UTC, which has been enacted in substance in all
UTC jurisdictions except Florida,14 ° plus in Indiana, 4 ' provides that a
"court may modify the administrative terms of a trust if continuation
of the trust on its existing terms would be impracticable or wasteful or
impair the trust's administration."'14 2  The official comment
emphasizes that this rule is based not on the settlor's presumed intent
that the trust remain solvent but rather on the fundamental
requirement that the trust must be run for the benefit of the
beneficiaries:
Although the settlor is granted considerable latitude in defining
the purposes of the trust, the principle that a trust have a
purpose which is for the benefit of its beneficiaries precludes
unreasonable restrictions on the use of trust property. An
owner's freedom to be capricious about the use of the owner's
own property ends when the property is impressed with a trust
for the benefit of others.143
138. 249 N.Y.S. 87 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1931), affd mem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (1932).
139. Id. at 95.
140. See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-412(b) (Supp. 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-412(b)
(Supp. 2005); D.C. CODE § 19-1304.12(b) (Supp. 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-412(b)
(Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 412(2) (Supp. 2006); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 456.4-412(2) (West Supp. 2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3838(b) (Supp. 2006); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-412(b) (2007); N.M. STAT. § 46A-4-412(B) (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 36C-4-412(b) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-12(2) (Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5804.12(B) (LexisNexis 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.205(2) (2005); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 7740.2(b) (Supp. 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-412(b) (Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 35-15-412(b) (Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-412(2) (Supp. 2006); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-544.12(B) (Supp. 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-413(b) (2005).
Florida's non-uniform statute authorizes administrative deviation when in the "best
interests of the beneficiaries" but requires the court to "conform[] to the extent possible
with the intent of the settlor." FLA. STAT. § 736.04115 (Supp. 2007).
141. See IND. CODE § 30-4-3-24.4(b)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
142. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(b).
143. Id. § 412 cmt. (emphasis added).
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The idea that a trust must be administered for the beneficiaries'
benefit is more than a policy. The rule has been codified in section
404 of the UTC: "A trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its
beneficiaries.' 14  Eighteen of the twenty UTC jurisdictions, plus
Iowa,45 have enacted this provision as a mandatory rule. 46
In order to ensure that the trust is being run for the benefit of the
beneficiaries, the trustee must have a duty to provide information
about the trust and its administration.
2. A Surrogate for Information?
An important question is whether the information must be
provided to the beneficiaries. This raises the issue of the role of other
parties, either a trust director 147 (who may be the settlor 48) or a trust
protector.149  American trust law recognizes the existence of trust
144. Id. § 404.
145. See IOWA CODE § 633A.2104(2) (2005).
146. See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-105(b)(3) (Supp. 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-
105(b)(3) (Supp. 2005); D.C. CODE § 19-1301.05(b)(3) (Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT.
§ 736.0404 (Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-105(b)(3) (Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(2)(C) (Supp. 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.1-105(2)(3) (West Supp.
2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(b)(3) (Supp. 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-
105(b)(3) (2007); N.M. STAT. § 46A-1-105(B)(3) (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-1-
105(b)(3) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-09-05(2)(c) (Supp. 2007); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 130.020(2)(c) (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-105(b)(3) (Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 35-15-105(b)(3) (Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-105(2)(c) (Supp. 2006); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-541.05(B)(3) (Supp. 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-105(b)(iii) (2005).
The outliers are Ohio and Pennsylvania. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5801.04
(LexisNexis 2006); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7705 (Supp. 2006).
147. American trust law permits the settlor to grant or retain the right to direct the
actions of the trustee (a "directory power" with the holder known as a "director"). See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 (2007). Depending on the terms of the trust, the
director may have authority over "distributions, investments, other aspects of property
management, removal and replacement of trustees, change of the situs of administration,
some questions of interpretation, modification of some trust provisions, and perhaps all of
these or even unlimited matters in which the [director] might choose to intervene."
Edward C. Halbach Jr., Fiduciary and Non-Fiduciary Powers: Where are the Lines and
What Are the Duties? An "Educated(?)" Guess, 2005 Nottingham Lecture at the
International Trust and Tax Planning Summit 15-16 (2005) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). In the reported cases, however, directory powers have often been
"narrow," see id. at 24, limited, for example, to approving or vetoing changes in trust
assets. See Ditmars v. Camden Trust Co., 76 A.2d 280, 289 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950),
modified on other grounds, 92 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1952). For discussion, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 Rep. Note (2007).
148. If the settlor retains a directory power, he exercises the power as a director, not as
the settlor.
149. Related to the idea of a director is the concept of a "trust protector": a third-party
role born in the context of offshore asset protection trusts and now authorized by some
American jurisdictions. See Alexander A. Bove, The Trust Protector: Trust(y) Watchdog
or Expensive Exotic Pet?, EST. PLAN., Aug. 2003, at 390 [hereinafter Bove, Trust(y)
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directors and trust protectors, 5 ' and this invites the question whether
a settlor can (or ought to be able to) substitute some such party for
the beneficiaries with respect to the duty to inform. Six of the twenty
UTC jurisdictions-Florida,15' Maine, 52  Missouri,'53  Ohio,54
Watchdog]; Alexander A. Bove Jr., Trust Protectors, 144 TR. & EST. 28 (2005) [hereinafter
Bove, Trust Protectors]; Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary
Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2764-70 (2006). The protector is designed to achieve
the settlor's purposes, exercising control over the trustee. See LAWRENCE W.
WAGGONER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MARY LOUISE FELLOWS & THOMAS P.
GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 14-33 (4th ed. 2006).
150. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. (2007); UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 808 cmt.
151. FLA. STAT. § 736.0306(1) (Supp. 2007) ("If authorized in the trust instrument, one
or more persons may be designated to represent and bind a beneficiary and receive any
notice, information, accounting, or report."); see also id. § 736.0813(1) ("The
representation provisions of Part III apply with respect to all rights of a qualified
beneficiary under this section.").
152. Under Maine law, the settlor may:
designat[el a person or persons, any of whom may or may not be a beneficiary, to
act in good faith to protect the interests of the qualified beneficiaries who are not
receiving notice, information or reports and to receive any notice, information or
reports required under section 813, subsection 1 or 2 in lieu of providing such
notice, information or reports to the qualified beneficiaries. The person or persons
designated under this paragraph are deemed to be representatives of the qualified
beneficiaries not receiving notice, information or reports for the purposes of the
time limitation for a beneficiary to commence an action against the trustee for
breach of trust as provided in section 1005, subsection 1.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(3) (Supp. 2006).
153. Under Missouri law, the settler may:
designate by the terms of the trust one or more permissible distributees to receive
notification of the existence of the trust and of the right to request trustee's reports
and other information reasonably related to the administration of the trust in lieu
of providing the notice, information or reports to any other permissible distributee
who is an ancestor or lineal descendant of the designated permissible distributee.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.1-105(3) (West Supp. 2007).
154. Ohio law provides:
With respect to one or more of the current beneficiaries, the settlor, in the trust
instrument, may waive or modify the duties of the trustee described in divisions
(B)(8) and (9) of this section. The waiver or modification may be made only by
the settlor designating in the trust instrument one or more beneficiary surrogates
to receive any notices, information, or reports otherwise required under those
divisions to be provided to the current beneficiaries. If the settlor makes a waiver
or modification pursuant to this division, the trustee shall provide the notices,
information, and reports to the beneficiary surrogate or surrogates in lieu of
providing them to the current beneficiaries. The beneficiary surrogate or
surrogates shall act in good faith to protect the interests of the current
beneficiaries for whom the notices, information, or reports are received. A waiver
or modification made under this division shall be effective for so long as the
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Oregon,55 and the District of Columbia' 56-already do so. These
jurisdictions permit the settlor to designate a surrogate to receive and
request information in lieu of the beneficiaries. The statutes leave
crucial questions unanswered, however, such as whether the surrogate
owes fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, what standard of care
governs the surrogate's actions or failures to act, 157 and whether the
surrogate has standing to sue the trustee for fiduciary breach.'58 Note
that these questions are also unresolved for trust directors and trust
protectors generally; commentators rightly disagree about where the
law stands on these issues.159
For purpose of the current discussion, let us assume the legal
environment most conducive to substituting another party for the
beneficiaries with respect to the duty to inform: namely, that the
surrogate owes full fiduciary obligations to the beneficiaries and has
authority to sue the trustee for breach of trust. Should the
substitution be permitted? The insights of economic analysis point to
a negative answer, as does a classical education: "Sed quis custodiet
beneficiary surrogate or surrogates, or their successor or successors designated in
accordance with the terms of the trust instrument, act in that capacity.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5801.04(C) (LexisNexis 2006).
155. Oregon law provides:
The settlor, in the trust instrument or in another writing delivered to the trustee,
may waive or modify the duties of a trustee ... to give notice, information and
reports to qualified beneficiaries by: ... (b) Designating a person or persons to act
in good faith to protect the interests of qualified beneficiaries and to receive any
notice, information or reports ... in lieu of providing the notice, information or
reports to the qualified beneficiaries.
OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020(3) (2005).
156. The law of the District of Columbia provides:
The settlor, in the trust instrument or in another writing delivered to the trustee,
may waive or modify the duties of a trustee ... to give notice, information, and
reports to beneficiaries by: ... (3) Designating a person or persons to act in good
faith to protect the interests of beneficiaries, to receive any notice, information, or
reports ... in lieu of providing such notice, information, or reports to the
beneficiaries.
D.C. CODE § 19-1301.05(c) (Supp. 2006).
157. The statutes in D.C., Florida, Maine, Ohio, and Oregon do answer this question,
imposing a requirement that the surrogate act "in good faith." D.C. CODE § 19-
1301.05(c)(3) (Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. § 736.0306(4) (Supp. 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-B, § 105(3)(B) (Supp. 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5801.04(C) (LexisNexis
2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020(3)(b) (2005).
158. See the criticisms of the D.C. statute in Millard, supra note 1, at 398-400.
159. See, e.g., Bove, Trust Protectors, supra note 149, at 29-30 (recognizing debate over
whether trust protectors must be fiduciaries); Bove, Trust(y) Watchdog, supra note 149, at
394 (discussing circumstances in which trust protectors might have standing to sue).
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ipsos custodes?"' The use of a surrogate adds an extra layer of
fiduciary administration but does not resolve the fundamental
problem of agency cost arising whenever "one party (the agent) has
discretionary and unobservable decisionmaking authority that affects
the wealth of another party (the principal).' 1 61 The trustee's actions
will be observable to the surrogate, but neither's actions will be
observable to the beneficiaries. Yet, it is only the beneficiaries who
have the full incentive to monitor the trustee's performance. Giving
the information to another party does not solve the misalignment of
incentives, 162 so it is hard to see the surrogate as an adequate
substitute.
To be sure, there are instances where a surrogate is unavoidable:
for example, in the event of unborn, minor, or incapacitated
beneficiaries. There may also be fact patterns where the benefits of a
surrogate outweigh the costs: for instance, where the beneficiaries
are adult but still relatively young (recall the UTC's treatment of
beneficiaries under age twenty-five 163) or, to take another example,
where the trust has so many beneficiaries that there is a substantial
danger of collective inaction."6 Additionally, it may be possible to
envision, at least in theory, a surrogate with such a strong
reputational incentive for effective monitoring that the surrogate's
interests are largely, though still not entirely, aligned with those of the
beneficiaries. 65
But these are the exceptions. In the ordinary case, a surrogate is
merely one more agent, hence not a solution to the problem of
agency cost. Some rights to information must remain in the
beneficiaries. 6
6
160. H.L. Wilson, The Bodleian Fragments of Juvenal, 22 AM. J. PHILOLOGY 268, 269
(1901) (quoting JUVENAL, SATIRE VI I. 347-48). In the present context, see Gregory S.
Alexander, Trust Protectors: Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2807
(2006).
161. Sitkoff, supra note 107, at 636.
162. For agreement on this point, see Alexander, supra note 160, at 2810 ("The more
power you give the trust protector, the more you simply swap one set of agency cost
problems for another."); Sterk, supra note 149, at 2796-800 (analyzing the potential for
breach of duty or inaction by the protector).
163. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
164. For an introduction to the economics of collective action (and inaction), see
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW ch. 6 (1994). I thank Robert
Sitkoff for this point.
165. For such a proposal in the context of nonprofit organizations, see Geoffrey A.
Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV.
227, 262 (1999).
166. For agreement with this position, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82
cmt. d (2007).
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3. Four Principles
What aspects of the duty to inform should remain mandatory?
In this closing section of the Article, I offer four normative principles
that I hope will guide the development of the law of the duty to
inform. First, and centrally, the duty to inform should result in the
beneficiaries having sufficient information to safeguard their
interests. This means sufficient information to monitor and evaluate
the trustee's performance and, if necessary, to take action in the event
of a breach of trust. Second, and related to the first, the duty to
inform should not be limited to the provision of information upon
request. There must be enough information provided automatically
so that the beneficiaries can make an informed request. Third, the
duty to inform should extend to sufficient beneficiaries to protect
against a violation of the trustee's fiduciary duty of impartiality.
Impartiality means that the trustee must balance the conflicting
economic interests of the trust's multiple beneficiaries, taking into
account the provisions and purposes of the trust. 67 When the group
of beneficiaries with access to information is too narrow, the danger
of partiality is real and significant. Fourth and last, the settlor should
not be able, as a routine matter, to designate a permanent surrogate
for the receipt of information. I am open to the idea that the settlor
might designate a surrogate for a limited time (for example, until a
beneficiary reaches maturity) if the surrogate owes fiduciary duties to
the beneficiary and is required to provide sufficient information to
the beneficiary when the period of substitution expires. I am also
open to the special cases discussed above where a surrogate would be
the best-available alternative or where there are strong reputational
reasons to believe that the surrogate will be an effective monitor. But
the routine use of a permanent surrogate is dangerous, for the
permanent surrogate will sustain, not solve, the fundamental agency
cost problem.
Taken together, these principles give the settlor room to shape
the contours of the duty to inform while preserving the beneficiaries'
essential safeguard against fiduciary breach.
CONCLUSION
The trustee's duty to keep beneficiaries informed of the trust and
its administration is a long-standing and crucial fiduciary obligation.
The duty to inform has a distinguished pedigree within the history of
167. See id. § 79.
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Anglo-American law and performs a vital function today, minimizing
the agency costs that inevitably arise when there is a separation
between the management of assets and their equitable ownership.
The trust's beneficiaries have the incentives and authority to monitor
the trustee's performance and to enforce the trustee's fiduciary
obligations. They must have the information needed to exercise their
monitoring and enforcement powers. The duty to inform can be
default law at the margins but must maintain a mandatory core.
